危险货物的起爆硬度(Sensitivity to rimary Explosion)系指()。
A . A.炸药对起爆炸时产生的爆轰波能量的敏感程度
B . B.生物机体对放射性物质的敏感度
C . C.船舶谐摇时货物产生的相应摇荡敏感度
D . D.油轮扫舱管线中油气压力的敏感度
相似题目
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在有瓦斯煤尘爆炸危险的工作面,正向起爆比反向起爆安全性高。
A . 正确
B . 错误
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适合于水下以及有沼气或矿尘爆炸危险条件下爆破作业的起爆器材有()
A . 导火索
B . 安全导爆索
C . 导爆管
D . 瞬发电雷管
E . 安全火雷管
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在有沼气爆炸危险的环境中进行爆破,应采用电起爆而禁止采用()起爆。
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火药、炸药、起爆药属于危险化学品中的()。
A . 氧化性物质
B . 易燃固体
C . 爆炸品
D . 毒害品
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在有瓦斯、煤尘、矿尘爆炸危险的地方,只准选用防爆型起爆器。
A . 正确
B . 错误
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在矿用爆破器材的起爆器材中,可以用于有瓦斯或矿尘爆炸危险的作业场所的是()。
A . 火雷管
B . 导火索
C . 导爆管
D . 电雷管
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在有瓦斯煤尘爆炸危险的工作面,正向起爆比反向起爆安全性()。
A . A、一样
B . B、低
C . C、高
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在有矿尘、煤尘或气体爆炸危险的矿井中爆破,禁止使用()起爆。
A . 导爆管
B . 电雷管
C . 导爆索
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Our __ sensitivity decreases with age. By age 60, most people have lost 40 percent of their ability to smell and 50 percent of their taste buds.
A . sensible
B . senseless
C . sensitive
D . sensory
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非电导爆管抗冲击,对火焰和电没危险,延时准确,起爆可靠。()
A . 正确
B . 错误
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有瓦斯或煤尘爆炸危险的采煤工作面,可采用分组装药,但一组装药必须一次起爆。()
A . 正确
B . 错误
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导爆管起爆法。()有瓦斯、矿尘爆炸危险的矿井。
A . 不能用于
B . 可用于
C . 可选择的用于
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火雷管起爆法可以在有沼气和矿尘爆炸危险的地方使用。
A . 正确
B . 错误
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在有矿尘或气体爆炸危险的矿井中爆破,禁止使用()起爆。
A . 瞬发电雷管
B . 火雷管
C . 延期电雷管
D . 抗静电电雷管
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第二次警笛为(),确认爆区和危险区正常无误,经班长同意后方可起爆。
A . 起爆准备
B . 起爆信号
C . 解除爆破信号
D . 收回警戒
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有瓦斯或煤尘爆炸危险的采煤工作面,可采用分组装药,但必须一次起爆
A . 正确
B . 错误
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The base of intercultural sensitivity or awareness is the capacity to avoid ethnocentrism.
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_________ requires a thorough understanding of how consumers’ sensitivity to prices varies over time.
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When you are uncertain about the proper etiquette in a particular situation, you need to have social sensitivity.()
此题为判断题(对,错)。
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Our__________sensitivity decreases with age. By age 60, most people have lost 40 percent of their ability to smell and 50 percent of their taste buds.
A. sensible
B. senseless
C. sensitive
D. sensory
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For eight years the Clinton Administration preached the need for exquisite sensitivity to the Russians. They'd had a rough time. They needed nurturing from their new American friends.
They got it. We fed them loans, knowing that much of the money would disappear corruptly. We turned away from atrocity in Chechnya lest we weaken the new Russian state. But most important, we went weak in the knees on missile defense. The prospect of American antiballistic missiles upset the Russians. And upsetting the Russians was something we simply were not to do.
The Russians cannot keep up with American technology. And they fear that an American missile shield will render obsolete their last remnant of greatness: their monster, nuclear-tipped missiles. So they insist that we adhere to a 1972 treaty signed with the defunct Soviet Union that prohibited either side from developing missile defenses. That the treaty is obsolete-it long predates the world of rogue states racing to acquire missile-launched weapons of mass destruction-does not concern the Russians. Withdraw from the treaty, they said, and you have destroyed the "strategic stability" on which the peace of the world depends.
The Clinton Administration took that threat seriously-so seriously that for eight years it equivocated on building an American ABM system. Finally, President Clinton promised to decide by June 2000. Come June, he punted.
Eight years, and no defense. But the bear was content.
Bear contentment was never a high priority for Ronald Reagan. He offered a different model for dealing with the Russians. The 1980s model went by the name of peace through strength. But it was more than that. It was judicious but unapologetic unilateralism. It was willingness-in the face of threats and bluster from foreign adversaries and nervous apprehension from domestic critics-to do what the U.S. needed to do for its own security. Regardless.
It was Reagan who famously proposed a missile shield, and even more famously refused to barter it away at the Reykjavik summit, an event many historians consider the turning point in the cold war. That marked the beginning of the Soviets' definitive realization that they were going to lose the arms race to the U.S.-and that neither threats nor cajoling would dissuade the U.S. from running it.
This decade starts with a return to the unabashed unilateralism of the 1980s. It began last year with a speech by George W. Bush proposing that the U.S. build weapons to meet American needs-and not to accommodate the complaints or gain the agreement of other countries. For 40 years the U.S. would not cut its offensive nuclear missiles except in conjunction with Soviet cuts. Bush's refreshing question was: Why? We don't need Rnssians cutting our offensive weapons through arms-control treaties. And we don't need Russians telling us whether or not to build defensive weapons.
This was the genesis of the Bush Doctrine, now taking shape as the Administration takes power. Its motto is, we build to suit-ourselves. Accordingly, the President and the Secretary of Defense have been unequivocal about their determination to go ahead with a missile defense.
They staked their claim. And what happened? Did the sky fall, as the Clinton Russian experts warned? On the contrary. Convinced at last of American seriousness, the Russians immediately acquiesced. After just one month of Bush, Moscow has come forward with its very own missile-defense plan. The fact that it is not well sketched out and that it is in part designed to split the U.S. off from Europe is beside the point. The Russians have responded, as did the Soviets before them, to American firmness. Faced with reality, they accommodate it.
Who defines reality; there lies the difference between this Administration and the last. Clinton let Russian opposition define reality. Bush, like Reagan, understands that the U.S. can resha
A.the Russians understood that they needed nurturing from their new American friends
B.the Russians knew Americans will surely help them
C.upsetting the Russians was something the Americans simply were not to do
D.the Americans shouldn't worry about upsetting the Russians
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允许在有瓦斯和煤尘爆炸危险的工作面使用的起爆器材是()
A.导爆管
B.导火索
C.导爆索
D.安全导爆索
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在有瓦斯爆尘爆炸危险的工作面,正向起爆比反向起爆安全性高。()
是
否
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火雷管起爆法可以在,有沼气和矿尘爆炸危险的地方使用